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Abstract: We examine an economy where professionals provide services to clients and where a 
professional can sell his practice to another. Professionals vary in quality, and clients in their 
need (or willingness-to-pay) for high-quality service. efficiency is measured as the number of 
matches between high-quality professionals and high-need clients. However, agent types are 
unobservable a priori. We find that trade in practices can facilitate the transmission of 
information about agent types; sometimes full efficiency is achieved. In cases where it is not, 
a tax on the sale of practices (based on the seller's age) can be used to achieve full efficiency. 
In addition, a ceiling on the price of services can be used to adjust the distribution of surplus 
between clients and professionals, while preserving efficiency.  
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At the time of which I speak, Holmes had been back for
some months, and I at his request had sold my practice and
returned to share the old quarters in Baker Street. A young
doctor, named Verner, had purchased my small Kensington
practice (. . . ).
— Dr. Watson in
The Return of Sherlock Holmes
1 Introduction
We examine a market for professional (legal, medical, dental, etc.) services. We
are interested not only in the interactions between professionals and their clients,
but also in the phenomenon of “selling one’s practice,” which happens when one
professional refers his clients to another professional, who pays a sum of money in
exchange.
Such a transaction presents an interesting information problem. When a practice
changes hands, the clientele is aware of the change and is free to take its business
elsewhere. Clearly a practice only has value if the new owner is confident that the
clientele will remain. But why should it? This is a key issue if a professional’s
quality is not observable at the time one pays for his services.
When we speak of practices in this paper, we abstract from such things as
physical capital, supplies, payroll, advantages attributable to location, etc. We wish
to focus exclusively on the truly intangible component, which has to do with clients’
expectations regarding the quality of services they will receive; this is commonly
called goodwill.
We will explore whether buying a practice may act as a signal of a professional’s
quality. We model professional services as experience goods. The first time a client
and professional meet, the client does not know the professional’s quality. If she
(the client) hires him (the professional), then she finds out his quality and on that
basis decides whether or not to hire him a second time. Needless to say, high-quality
professionals have an easier time retaining clients than low-quality ones. For this
reason, we might expect high-quality professionals to have a greater incentive to
buy practices. When they do, they feel confident that they can keep the clientele
for two periods. Low-quality professionals, on the other hand, can only expect to
keep them for one. Is this enough to ensure separation of the two types? That is
to say, is it the case in equilibrium that only high-quality professionals buy and sell
practices?
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A closely related issue is the efficiency of client-professional pairings. Clients
are heterogeneous in our model: some (type-A clients) value high-quality services
more than others (type-B clients). This willingness-to-pay is unobservable. Nat-
urally professionals seek out type-A clients at the same time that clients seek out
high-quality professionals. An efficient outcome would be one where the number of
matches between high-quality professionals and type-A clients is maximized.
We find that efficient equilibria can exist, but only if there is a relative abundance
of type-A clients: in these equilibria, all high-quality professionals buy practices,
but some low-quality ones buy them too. When this abundance criterion is not
met, equilibrium is inefficient. The problem is that the incentive for a low-quality
professional to pass himself off as a high-quality one, even for a single period, is too
strong. As a result, low-quality professionals buy practices. The fact that they do
so dilutes the signal that the purchase of a practice is supposed to represent, inciting
some high-quality professionals not to buy them.
This inefficiency can be remedied. The proper intervention is one which would
block early resales of practices. To us the most obvious one is a tax on the sale of
practices based on the age of the seller, an observable characteristic. Professionals
who sell their practice before retirement pay the tax, whereas those who sell when
they retire are exempt. With such a policy in place, one gets a separating equilibrium
and efficient outcome.
However, taxation alone may not necessarily be desirable. In an inefficient equi-
librium, some rents are captured by professionals, some by clients. Taxation can
make the situation fully efficient, which it does by increasing total rents (or surplus);
but in the process it can redistribute them and make clients worse off. We show that
a social planner can achieve full efficiency and make clients better off than before by
combining taxation with a second policy instrument, namely a ceiling on the price
of professional services. The latter allows him to make a direct transfer of utility
from professionals to clients, without any deadweight loss.
The rest of this section deals with the relevant literature. Section 2 presents
a model of the market for professional services without any trade in practices; it
introduces the reader to the way interactions between clients and professionals (pros
for short) are treated in the paper. Section 3 then presents the model augmented by
a trade in practices. Section 4 shows how taxation can be used to promote efficiency.
Then Section 5 demonstrates how a price ceiling can be used to transfer surplus from
professionals to clients. A brief summary and discussion follow in Section 6. All
proofs are to be found in an appendix.
1.1 Related Literature
Most of the literature on reputation focuses on long-lived agents and does not con-
sider reputation as an asset that can be traded between firms (see Fudenberg and
Tirole, chap. 9, for a presentation of this literature). Kreps (1990) is the first in-
vestigation of reputation trading and shows that there exists an equilibrium where
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reputation is a valuable asset that provides incentives to short-lived firms to exert
more effort. However, this reputation equilibrium is one among many and is as
likely to happen as less favorable ones.
Mailath and Samuelson (2001) and Tadelis (2002) extend Kreps’ setup to inves-
tigate the incentive aspect of reputation trading. They consider a heterogeneous
set of firms, composed of inept (low-type) and competent (high-type) firms. The
latter can choose to exert an effort to increase the probability of providing a high-
quality service (a “success;” as opposed to a low-quality service, a “failure”). They
show that reputation trading gives incentives for competent firms to exert effort.
As in Tadelis (1999, 2003), they also investigate the ability of reputation trading to
operate as a screening device between low-type (inept) and high-type firms.
In all these studies there is a clear distinction between a firm’s name, or entity,
and its owner’s identity. Also it is assumed that customers cannot observe changes
in firm ownership. The name’s reputation is publicly known, i.e. customers and
entrepreneurs know if the services provided by each name in the past were suc-
cesses, failures, or any sequence of those events. This name’s record determines the
price that the owner of the name can charge customers, and thereby, the price of
the name on the name market. They show that names’ good reputations cannot
serve as sorting devices that separate high-type from low-type entrepreneurs: there
is no equilibrium in which only high-type entrepreneurs buy good reputation names.
Indeed, if good reputation names were only bought by high-type entrepreneurs, cus-
tomers’ expectations about the quality of the firm’s services would not be violently
shaken by the occurrence of a failure, making a good reputation name very valuable
for low-type firms. As high-type entrepreneurs are more likely than low-type ones
to be successful in building their own name, they would value less a good name than
their low-type counterparts, and customers’ expectations would not be rational. In
equilibrium on the name market, both types of entrepreneurs buy good reputation
names.
Contrary to this approach, we assume that a professional’s record is not public
information: only clients who have benefited from his services in the past know
the professional’s type. Moreover, we assume that a change in practice ownership
is observable. We consider clients with heterogeneous valuations for high-quality
service, which also impedes the assessment of the practice by other professionals.
However, a professional who desires to sell his practice can evidence its value by the
practice’s “books” (the record of the price paid by his recent clientele) to buyers
who approach him.
Developing an approach somewhat close to ours, Hakenes and Peitz (HP, 2007)
obtain completely different results. They find that reputation is tradeable, i.e. that a
competitive market allows high-value practices to be sold to good professionals over
time. The reason for this striking difference comes from two opposite assumptions
on the information available to professionals and clients. First, HP assume that
when a professional buys a practice, he can identify immediately the seller’s type.
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In our model, however, the only information a practice-buyer may rely upon is
the last price paid by the client in this practice. Second, although clients in HP’s
model observe that the ownership of their practice has changed, their beliefs as to
the type of the new practice-owner are based only on the services provided by the
previous professional. In our model these beliefs are based on the age of the new
owner. As a result, in HP’s model, if a low-type professional buys a high-value
practice, he pockets a price premium from the high-type clients the first period,
but these good customers run away afterward and the practice becomes worthless.
The professional cannot resell it for a good price after one period because potential
buyers can identify his type and infer that since he has offered bad services in the
previous period, the high-value clients will not return to this practice anymore.
The high-type clients’ equilibrium strategy, which is “go back to the practice if the
service was good the previous period, otherwise switch to another professional,” is
supported by the belief that the quality of the next service will be the same as the
previous one, whoever is the owner of the practice. In our model, clients can infer
the type of the new practice owner from his age (either “young” or “old”), and
from professionals’ equilibrium strategies. Hence, even if they had a bad experience
with the former owner, clients will first check who the new professional is (his age)
and give him a try if they believe that he is a provider of good services. As a
consequence, a low-type professional can buy a high-value practice and resell it at
a high price if he runs it only for one period: he can prove from the books to a
potential buyer that the practice is a high-value one, and the buyer knows that he
will have his chance with the practice’s client whatever the seller’s type. Compared
to HP, then, the conditions for efficiency and for separating equilibrium are more
demanding in our setup, and the possibility of a high reputation being tradeable is
very slim without government intervention. In a way, because clients obtain some
information from the observation of the new practice owner, the resulting market
equilibria are worse than if they had the “naive” (uninformed) beliefs that a service
has the same quality from one period to the other no matter who runs the practice.
2 Benchmark: The Model Without Practices
To give a sense of how the economy functions in our model, we first present a version
in which clients hire professionals, but professionals do not buy or sell practices.
Much of the reasoning presented here will be used in later sections. For clarity,
when a professional and client meet, we will refer to the professional as “him” and
to the client as “her.”
2.1 Setup
Time elapses discretely without beginning or end. We are interested in steady-
state equilibria. The market is for services, which are provided by professionals (or
pros) and purchased by clients. We shall not call them buyers and sellers, since we
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reserve these terms for the next section, where professionals buy and sell practices.
All agents are risk-neutral and have a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
Professionals work for two periods, first as young professionals, then as old ones;
then they retire. At the start of each period, a measure 1 of young professionals
enter the economy; those who were young in the previous period (also a measure 1)
now become old; and those who were old in the previous period (again, a measure
1) now retire. Hence there is always a measure 2 of working professionals in the
economy, half of them young, half of them old. Each generation of professionals is
composed of a measure q of high-quality (type-H) professionals and a measure 1− q
of low-quality (type-L) ones. These qualities are exogenous and fixed: a professional
is born with a certain type, and stays that way. Each professional has one indivisible
unit of service for sale in each period; that is to say, he may see only one client per
period.
Clients are infinitely-lived. They are of two types, A and B. Type-A clients value
high-quality services more than type-B clients do, in a way which will be specified
shortly. There is a measure ψA of type-A agents and a measure ψB of type-B agents
present in the economy at all times. We assume that ψA < 1 + q. We also assume
that ψA + ψB > 2: clients outnumber working professionals. [A professional is
working if he is selling his services, i.e. if he is young or old; in the following section
we will also have retiring professionals, who sell practices but not services. ]
Types (A, B, L and H) are private information, as are past histories. When a
professional and client transact, they learn one another’s types. A professional’s age
is publicly observable.
A central question in this paper is how professionals and clients are matched.
There will be no frictions as far as matching is concerned. Since clients outnumber
working professionals, this means that in each period, every working professional
will be matched with a client.
In some cases, a professional will serve the same client when young and old, while
in other cases he will not. This is determined as follows. As soon as a professional
becomes old, i.e. at the beginning of his second period, he negotiates with the client
he served when young. This is an opportunity for the professional and client to
renew or break off their business relationship. Note that at this point the two know
each other’s types. The professional makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the client.
The offer is a price for his services in the period which has just begun. If the client
accepts, they transact and are considered matched for the rest of that period; we say
that their previous match has been renewed. If the client rejects the offer, the match
is dissolved: the two part ways and must seek new matches. These negotiations take
place at the beginning of a period, in what we call the negotiation phase.
The negotiation phase is immediately followed by an open market phase. This
is a centralized market for professional services, and involves all unmatched agents.
This means (i) all agents whose matches were broken during the negotiation phase,
and (ii) all those who did not participate in the negotiation phase. The latter
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group is composed of young professionals (they have just entered the economy) and
clients who in the preceding period were served by old professionals (now retired).
Market-clearing prices are established as if by an auctioneer. Professionals’ ages are
observable, so there will be two prices in this phase: one for the services of young
professionals, which we denote pY , and one for those of old professionals, which we
denote pO. In either case, the price is for one period only of service.
Per-period utilities are as follows. A professional, whatever his type, has no
costs: his utility is simply the price he receives for his unit of service. A type-i
client who pays p for a unit of service gets utility θiH − p if the professional he deals
with is high-quality, and θL − p if low-quality, where
0 < θL < θBH < θAH . (1)
Anyone who does not transact gets zero utility for that period.1 All agents max-
imize lifetime discounted utility. Since clients outnumber working professionals,
and since all professional services provide positive utility, in equilibrium all working
professionals will be employed.
An equilibrium consists of:
• a market-clearing price for young professionals on the market, pY ;
• a market-clearing price for old professionals on the market, pO;
• for each possible client-professional pairing (A-H, A-L, B-H and B-L), an optimal
price to be offered by the professional when the partnership is up for renewal
(i.e. during the negotiation phase), and an optimal acceptance-rejection rule to
be implemented by the client.
These values and rules must be the same from period to period.
2.2 Efficiency
Since type-A clients value high-quality service more than type-B ones do (relative
to low-quality service and no service), social efficiency can be measured by the
number of A-H matches. A socially optimal outcome is one where either all type-H
professionals in a given period (young and old) are matched with type-A clients,
or all type-A clients are matched with type-H professionals. That is to say, the
1Properly speaking, these parameters measure willingness to pay rather than utility. And so
type-A clients may or may not be the wealthier ones. Suppose for instance that both types get the
same utility from high-quality service (say, perfect health), but that type-A clients get lower utility
from receiving low-quality service or no service at all. It may be, then, that both types have equal
or comparable wealth, but that type-A clients need high-quality service more than type-B clients
do. Then θAH , θBH and θL may still measure the appropriate willingnesses to pay, and (1) may
still reflects the relation between them.
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measure of A-H matches in a given period must be equal to min{ψA, 2q}, since ψA
and 2q are, respectively, the measures of type-A and type-H agents in the economy.
The assumption that ψA < 1 + q will play a large part in our proofs, and it is
not hard to see why. If we allowed ψA ≥ 1 + q, then in equilibrium type-A clients
would hire all young professionals and renew their relationships with all the type-
H ones. The social optimum would be achieved, but only because type-A clients,
by their sheer numbers, prevented type-B clients from ever meeting high-quality
professionals. This could almost be called brute force. Even allowing trade in
practices, something we do in the next section, does not affect this.
Things are more interesting when ψA < 1+q. In this case something rather more
complex is required to obtain a socially efficient outcome. Whether the necessary
mechanism occurs naturally in the marketplace or must be imposed by a governing
authority is one of the key issues of this paper.
2.3 Equilibrium
Let Vi be the value to a type-i client of being on the open market, i.e. without a
match. And let Vij be the value to a type-i client of being in the negotiation phase
with a type-j professional.
Let us look at the negotiation phase first. Consider a client-professional relation-
ship which is up for renewal. By this time the client and professional have learned
each other’s types. The professional makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, consisting of a
price p for his services for one period. First, let us look at this from the client’s point
of view. Suppose, to illustrate, that the client’s type is A and the professional’s is
H. If the client accepts the offer, her payoff this period is θAH−p, and she returns to
the open market next period (when the professional retires), which makes her total
discounted payoff θAH − p+ δVA. If she rejects the offer, she returns to the market
this period and gets VA. The highest price she will consider is that which makes
these two values equal. In general if we denote by pij the highest price that a type-i
client is willing to accept from a type-j professional, we have
piH = θiH − (1− δ)Vi ; (2)
piL = θL − (1− δ)Vi . (3)
In equilibrium the client will accept any offer p ≤ pij and reject any offer p > pij.
From the professional’s perspective, the situation is quite simple. If his offer of
p is accepted, he gets that price; if it is rejected, he goes on the market this period
and gets pO, the market price for old professionals’ services. And no matter what
happens this period, he will retire next period. Clearly the best thing for him to do
if pij > pO is to offer pij, and this will be accepted. If pij < pO then no agreement
is possible: the professional makes an unacceptable offer and both he and the client
end up on the market. If pij = pO he is indifferent between the two outcomes.
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We see that the client will never be offered a price below the maximum she is
willing to pay. In equilibrium there are two outcomes for her: either she will accept
an offer of pij, which will leave her no better and no worse off than being on the
market; or she will reject an offer of p > pij, and she will end up on the market.
Either way the result is the same:
Vij = Vi . (4)
On the open market, a client can purchase the services of a young professional
at price pY , those of an old professional at price pO, or she can purchase nothing.
If she hires a young professional, she has a probability q of getting high-quality
service. Let qO denote the probability of receiving high-quality service when hiring
an old professional: this is the proportion of high-quality professionals among all
old professionals on the open market. Thus a client gets expected utility qθiH +(1−
q)θL−pY for this period if she hires a young professional, and qOθiH +(1−qO)θL−pO
if she hires an old one; she gets 0 if she hires no one. In all three cases she expects δVi
from next period onward, whether on the market or in negotiations, since Vij = Vi
as we have shown. Thus the client’s prospects can be written as
(1− δ)Vi = max{q θiH + (1− q) θL − pY ,
qO θiH + (1− qO) θL − pO , 0} . (5)
We may make two observations at this point. The first concerns qO, the propor-
tion of high quality among old professionals on the market. This fraction depends
on which matches are renewed during the negotiation phase and which are not. For
instance, if all A-H and B-H matches are renewed but some or all of the A-L and B-L
matches are dissolved, then all the old professionals on the market will be type-L,
so that qO = 0. As we have seen, the renewal or dissolution of matches during ne-
gotiations depends on how pO compares to the different pij’s. If pO < pij the match
is renewed; if pO > pij it is dissolved. There is one thing we can be certain of: since
pAH > pAL and pBH > pBL, type-H professionals are at least as likely to renew their
matches as type-L ones. Consequently qO ≤ q.
Our second observation concerns VB. At all times there is a measure 2 of pro-
fessionals in the economy, half of them young, half of them old. We have assumed
ψA+ψB > 2, so there are more clients than professionals. For markets to clear, some
clients have to demand no services; in other words, we must have either VA = 0 or
VB = 0 or both. Inspection of (1) and (5) shows that VA = 0 implies VB = 0. So it
is certainly the case that VB = 0 in equilibrium.
We may now determine equilibrium values of pY , pO and qO.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium some type-B clients hire young professionals, and pY =
qθBH + (1− q)θL.
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Since VB = 0, we must have pO ≥ qOθBH + (1 − qO)θL. Using this, the price pY
found in Lemma 1, and the fact that qO ≤ q, we can deduce through (5) that, for
a type-A client, the value of hiring a young professional is positive and at least as
high as the value of hiring an old one. Hence (1− δ)VA = qθAH + (1− q)θL − pY =
q(θAH − θBH). Knowing VA and VB, we can use (2) and (3) to calculate threshold
prices for the negotiation phase:
pAH = qθBH + (1− q)θAH ; (6)
pBH = θBH ; (7)
pAL = θL − q(θAH − θBH) ; (8)
pBL = θL . (9)
Note that pAL may be negative. This would simply mean that in an A-L match no
positive price could induce the client to renew the relationship.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium qO = 0, i.e. there are no old type-H professionals on the
market.
Lemma 3. In equilibrium pO = θL.
From equations (6) through (9), we can easily ascertain that
pAL < pBL = pO < pBH < pAH . (10)
As a result, all A-H and B-H matches are renewed; A-L matches are dissolved; and
B-L matches can be either renewed or dissolved.
Looking at VA once more, we see that a type-A client, when on the market,
always hires a young professional: she strictly prefers this option to the others. If
the professional turns out to be high-quality, the match is renewed at price pAH : the
professional serves the client one more period, then retires, and the client is back
on the market. If the professional is low-quality, an unacceptable offer is made, and
both go straight to the market.
Type-B clients on the market are indifferent among their three options — hiring
a young professional, hiring an old one, and hiring no one — and indeed for markets
to clear each option must be chosen by at least some of them. When a type-B client
is matched with a young type-H professional, the match is renewed at price pBH . A
match between a type-B client and a young type-L professional may or may not be
renewed, since pO = pBL = θL. Whether or not it is does not affect anyone’s payoff.
For completeness, let us now determine exactly how many type-A clients hire
young professionals in a given period. Let α denote the proportion of type-A clients
among those clients hiring young professionals. In this benchmark case, the measure
of clients of either type who hire young professionals is 1, so the measure of type-A
clients who hire young professionals is just α. Since all A-H matches are renewed,
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there must in each period be a measure αq of type-A clients served by old type-H
professionals, with whom they have renewed their relationship from the previous
period. Since A-L matches are not renewed and type-A clients do not hire old
professionals, this accounts for all type-A clients. Therefore α + αq = ψA, which is
to say
α =
ψA
1 + q
. (11)
Client behavior in turn tells us what may happen to a professional during his
career. This is depicted in Figure 1. Time is represented horizontally and increases
towards the right. Two generations of professionals are shown: one of them is young
at time t− 1 and old at t; the other is young at t and old at t+ 1. Each horizontal
stratum represents a possible history for a professional. First he goes on the market
when young, and is matched with either a type-A or type-B client; then his match
can be renewed (indicated by an arrow) or not; if not, he again goes on the market
and is matched again. As the figure shows, (i) all A-H and B-H matches are renewed,
and (ii) old professionals on the market are matched with type-B clients, as type-A
clients will not hire them. [B-L matches may or may not be renewed; in the diagram
they are.] To the right of each stratum is written the measure of such histories in
a generation. The column labeled t gives us an idea of the state of the economy in
steady state.
b
a
b
a
ren.
b
ren.
ren.
H
L
α q
(1−α) q
α (1−q)
(1−α) (1−q)
-
-
-
b
a
b
a
ren.
b
ren.
ren.
H
L
α q
(1−α) q
α (1−q)
(1−α) (1−q)
-
-
-
t− 1 t t+ 1
Figure 1. Professionals’ histories in equilibrium. The
letters a and b mean being hired by that type of client
during the market phase. Arrows indicate matches
renewed during the negotiation phase.
In equilibrium all A-H matches are renewed. In any period there are thus αq
type-A clients matched with young type-H professionals, and the same number
matched with old type-H professionals. The total, 2αq, is less than ψA, the total
measure of type-A clients in the economy. It is also less than 2q, the total measure of
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type-H professionals present at any one time. This is because A-L and B-H pairings
are inevitably formed on the market, where young professionals have no way of
revealing their type. As a result, we have
Proposition 1. An equilibrium without trade in practices is not socially efficient.
3 The Model With Practices
We now add a market for practices. Practices in our model are essentially options
to negotiate with particular clients. The market for practices is therefore distinct
from the market for services. Services are provided by professionals and purchased
by clients, whereas practices are traded among professionals only. Professionals who
have just reached retirement age play a role in this section, so it is useful to keep in
mind that there are three ages for professionals: young, old, and retiring.
Each period now has three phases: a practice phase, a negotiation phase, and an
open market phase, in that order.
At the beginning of the period, professionals who served a client in the previous
period (i.e. those who are now old or retiring) may sell this match for a sum
k. When they do so, they give up the right to negotiate with that client in the
upcoming negotiation phase: they are no longer matched. This is called selling a
practice.
The professional who buys the practice acquires the right to negotiate with the
client in question. He may be a young professional who has just entered the economy.
Or he may be a professional who has just become old. In the latter case, since he can
only negotiate with a single client, he must break up the match with his previous
client, either by selling his old practice at the same time that he is buying the new
one, or simply by abandoning his previous client.
When a professional sells a practice, he makes known to potential buyers the last
price paid by the client for his services. This assumption has some basis in reality:
a professional buying a practice often has access to “the books,” i.e. records of past
transactions between the seller of the practice and his clientele. In our model this
information allows the buyer to ascertain the client’s type.
When a practice is sold, the client is aware of the transaction (she sees that she
is matched with someone new) but does not participate in it. Naturally we want to
give her a say in the matter, i.e. a choice whether to accept this new match or take
her business elsewhere. Formally we delay this choice until the negotiation phase:
when the new owner of the practice makes the client an offer, then the client can
decide whether to accept the offer or go on the market.
We wish to emphasize that we use the term practice only in the narrow sense
of a clientele that is sold from one professional to another. In our model matches
formed on the open market (during the market phase) are not called practices.
The buying and selling of practices takes place at the beginning of the period,
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during what we call the practice phase. Once the practice phase is over, retiring
professionals formally retire and have no further role in the economy.
The negotiation phase comes next. As before, all professionals who are matched
with clients make take-it-or-leave-it offers to those clients. This time the profession-
als involved are: (i) all those (young or old) who have just bought practices, and (ii)
all old professionals who have not bought or sold practices. When a client accepts,
the transaction proceeds at the proposed price and the two parties are considered
matched for the remainder of the period. When she refuses, both parties go on the
open market.
The one difference between negotiations here and negotiations in the previous
section is that here information is not always perfect. If the professional has just
acquired the practice, he and the client have not had an opportunity to learn each
other’s types. The professional will try to infer the client’s type based on the infor-
mation supplied him by the previous owner, i.e. the last price paid by the client.
The client will form a belief as to the professional’s type based on the one thing
about him which she can observe: his age. This will be explained later.
The open market phase is, as before, a centralized market for professional ser-
vices. All unmatched agents participate. These are:
• all agents whose matches were broken up during the negotiation phase;
• young professionals who did not buy practices;
• old professionals who have just sold practices and did not buy new ones;
• clients who in the previous period were served by old professionals (now retired),
if these professionals did not sell their practices;
• clients who in the previous period were served by young professionals, if these
professionals bought new practices without selling their old ones.
Figure 2 summarizes the timing.
3.1 Negotiation Strategies
As with the benchmark model, we begin our analysis with the negotiation phase.
There are now two distinct situations to look at. The professional and client may
have been matched in the previous period, in which case they now know each other’s
types. Or it may be that the professional has just bought a practice, in which case
neither agent knows the other’s type. In the latter situation, the professional knows
the last price paid by the client. We assume for now that this price fully reveals the
client’s type. Afterward we will show that this must be the case in equilibrium.
In our model only practices consisting of type-A clients are exchanged. The
reason why B-practices cannot be traded in equilibrium will be explained later.
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Figure 2. Timing.
The client’s strategy during negotiations is to have a threshold price: she accepts
any price equal to or less than this threshold and rejects any price above it. This
threshold is based on her information and on her reservation payoff.
Let Vi be the value to a type-i client of being on the open market, just as in
Section 2. The value to her of being in negotiations with any professional must
be equal to Vi in equilibrium. The reasoning is basically the same as in Section 2.
During negotiations, the professional knows the client’s type — or infers it correctly
from the last price paid. He knows, then, the client’s threshold. This is the price
which makes the client indifferent between accepting and rejecting. His optimal
strategy is to offer this price (if he wants the offer to be accepted) or a higher one
(if he wants the offer to be rejected). In either case, the client gets a payoff equal
to her reservation payoff. And since a client goes directly to the open market upon
rejecting an offer, this reservation payoff is Vi.
When the professional and client know each other from before, the maximum
price the client is willing to accept is found in the same way as in Section 2. We
again call this price pij, where i is the client’s type and j the professional’s. The
four possibilities are given by equations (2) and (3).
If the professional is the new owner of a practice, however, then he is someone
the client has never seen before. We call this the new-owner situation. Here the
client, whom we suppose to be type-A, must form a belief as to the professional’s
type in order to decide how to proceed. That is, she ascribes a probability µ to the
professional being type-H. If she accepts an offer of p, her expected payoff for this
period is µθAH + (1− µ)θL − p. This is followed next period by VA (on the market
or via negotiations), making the total µθAH + (1−µ)θL− p+ δVA. If she rejects the
offer, she goes on the market this period and gets VA. The highest price she will
consider is that which makes these two values equal. This belief µ can be contingent
on the new owner’s age, his only observable characteristic.2 Let us denote this belief
2We do not allow the client to condition her belief on the previous owner’s characteristics (age,
type), since this would not be in the spirit of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. If for instance the client
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by µY when the new owner is young and by µO when he is old. The threshold prices
are
pAY = µY θAH + (1− µY )θL − (1− δ)VA ; (12)
pAO = µOθAH + (1− µO)θL − (1− δ)VA . (13)
In equilibrium, as mentioned, the professional knows his client’s threshold price.
He compares this to what he can get on the market and makes his offer accordingly.
For instance, a young professional who has just bought a practice compares pAY to
pY . If pAY > pY he wants to keep this client: he offers p = pAY and the offer is
accepted. If pAY < pY he prefers to go on the market: he offers p > pAY and the
offer is rejected. If pAY = pY he will do one or the other.
3.2 Market Values
Since young professionals may buy practices, the proportion of type H among the
young ones on the market is not necessarily q anymore. Let qY denote this propor-
tion. Define qO as before: it is the analog of qY for old professionals. Clients on the
market face the same choices, yielding this time
(1− δ)Vi = max{qY θiH + (1− qY ) θL − pY ,
qO θiH + (1− qO) θL − pO , 0} . (14)
And as before, clients outnumber working professionals, implying that some clients
on the market have zero value. Since VA = 0 implies VB = 0, we must certainly have
VB = 0. As a consequence,
pY ≥ qY θBH + (1− qY )θL ; (15)
pO ≥ qOθBH + (1− qO)θL . (16)
3.3 Professional strategies
A type-L professional who never buys practices obtains a career payoff of
V NNL = pY + δpO ; (17)
labelled NN for “no practice, no practice.” He gets pO when old because he can
secure this by going on the market but cannot get more than this from his previous
client, since pO ≥ θL ≥ max{pAL, pBL}. Another strategy is to go on the market
when young and buy a practice when old; the payoff is
believed that a new practice owner was type-L whenever the previous owner was type-L, she would
be performing non-Bayesian updating; her belief would not be consistent with how professionals
actually behaved in equilibrium.
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V NPL = pY − δk + δpAO + δ2k . (18)
labelled NP for “no practice, practice”. Here k is the price of a practice. The
professional pays it out when he buys the practice and gets it back when he sells
the practice. Since he was old when he bought the practice, the client believes with
probability µO that he is type-H. Hence he can obtain price pAO for his services in
that period.
If a type-L professional were to buy a practice when young, his client would
believe with probability µY that he is type-H, hence he could charge her pAY . The
following period, however, he could get no more than pAL from this same client, since
by then she would know his type. He would be better off selling the practice after
a single period and looking for a new client. This gives rise to two more strategies.
One of these consists of buying a practice when young, selling it after one period
and going on the market (“practice, no practice”), which yields
V PNL = −k + pAY + δk + δpO , (19)
The other is to buy a practice when young, sell it after one period and immediately
(i.e. during the same practice phase) buy another:
V PPL = −k + pAY + δpAO + δ2k . (20)
Let us turn now to type-H professionals. Never buying a practice results in an
expected payoff of
V NNH = pY + α δmax{pO, pAH + δk}+ (1− α) δmax{pO, pBH} . (21)
Here α is the probability for a young professional on the market to be matched with
a type-A client; we need not calculate it at this point. If he does meet a type-A client
on the market when young, then the following period he can charge pAH . Having
charged pAH , a price high enough to prove that his client is type-A, he can then sell
the match when he retires. This cannot actually happen in equilibrium: since all
practices which are bought are eventually sold, and since the number of practices
being held must remain constant from one period to the next, we cannot allow new
practices to be created in this way.
A type-H professional can also buy a practice when young and sell it after only
one period, obtaining
V PNH = −k + pAY + δk + δpO ; (22)
or buy a practice and hold it for two periods, by renewing the match at price pAH ,
obtaining
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V PPH = −k + pAY + δpAH + δ2k . (23)
Finally, he can wait until he is old to buy a practice. For a type-H pro, however,
buying a practice when old only makes sense if he is not already matched with a
type-A client from the previous period. If he is already matched with a type-A
client, it would be preferable to renew the match, then sell it as a practice. [Again,
this cannot happen in equilibrium.] The expected payoff is therefore
V NPH = pY + α δmax{pO, pAH + δk}+ (1− α) δ (−k + pAO + δk) . (24)
3.4 Equilibrium Without Government Intervention
In this section we are interested in identifying properties of equilibrium, and in
particular the conditions under which an efficient equilibrium exists. As in the
benchmark model, all young and old professionals will be employed in equilibrium,
since they are the short side of the market. Let us begin with some preliminary
results.
Lemma 4. In equilibrium qY ≤ q and µY ≥ q.
Lemma 5. In equilibrium qO ≤ q.
As mentioned, professionals selling practices show prospective buyers the last
price paid by their client, as proof that these clients are type-A. In equilibrium,
then, these prices must exceed the most that type-B clients would be willing to pay
under the same circumstances. This is the object of the following result.
Lemma 6. The prices pAY and pAH paid by clients in practices fully reveal that these
clients are type-A.
The lemma makes no mention of pAO. In the equilibria we will consider, however,
this price is never actually paid.
We now address the question of efficiency specifically.
Lemma 7. In an efficient equilibrium, some type-B clients hire young professionals,
some hire old ones, and as a result market prices are pY = qY θBH + (1− qY )θL and
pO = qOθBH + (1− qO)θL.
An equilibrium is deemed efficient when the number of A-H matches in each
period is at its highest possible value, namely min{ψA, 2q}. If ψA ≤ 2q, this means
that all type-A clients must be matched with type-H pros all the time: there can
be no A-L matches. Such an equilibrium is not possible, however, as the following
shows.
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Lemma 8. There can be no efficient equilibrium if ψA ≤ 2q.
For the opposite case, i.e. ψA > 2q, efficiency means type-H pros must be
matched with type-A clients when young and old: there can be no B-H matches.
In this case an efficient equilibrium is possible, but actually a stronger condition
than ψA > 2q is required. Type-A clients have to be abundant enough to employ
all type-H pros and some of the type-L ones as well.
Proposition 2. An efficient equilibrium exists if and only if
ψA ≥ 2q +
[
θBH − θL
θAH − θBH
]
q . (25)
Example 1. Let θL = 1, θBH = 2, θAH = 3, q = 0.3, ψA = 1.1, and ψB = 2. Let
δ be any number in (0, 1). Then an equilibrium exists, as follows. Market prices
are pY = pO = 1. Market proportions are qY = qO = α = 0. Threshold prices are
pAH = 3, pBH = 2, pAL = pBL = 1, pAY = 1.75, and pAO = 1. Market values are
VA = VB = 0. Beliefs are µY = 0.375 and µO = 0. The price of a practice is given
by (1 − δ)k = 0.75. It is straightforward to verify that V PPH is the best payoff for
type-H pros and that V NNL and V
PN
L are the best ones for type-L pros. All type-A
clients are in practices. Type-B clients hire both young and old pros; some hire no
one. All type-H pros buy practices when young and hold them for two periods (PP).
A measure 0.5 of young type-L pros buy practices when young and sell them after
one period (PN); the rest never buy practices. Figure 3 illustrates. Since pO = pBL,
B-L matches may or may not be renewed; in the figure they are.
b
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b
ren.H
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0.3
0.5
0.2
-
-
b
practice
practice
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b
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0.3
0.5
0.2
-
-
t− 1 t t+ 1
Figure 3. Professionals’ histories in Example 1. The
word “practice” means the purchase of a practice. The
letter b means being hired by a type-B client during
the market phase. Arrows indicate matches renewed
during the negotiation phase.
What we may distill from this result, and from condition (25) in particular,
is that it is hard, in the absence of government intervention, to exclude type-L
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professionals from the market for practices. Efficiency requires that all type-H pros
buy practices. It is impossible, however, to incite all of them to do so without
also inciting the type-L ones. That is why there need to be more type-A clients
than type-H professionals in the economy. How much more depends on S, which
summarizes the utility parameters generating the incentives.
The following theorem, combined with the previous, guarantees that an equilib-
rium always exists.
Proposition 3. An (inefficient) equilibrium exists if (25) is not met.
Example 2. Let θL = 1, θBH = 2, θAH = 5, q = 0.3, ψA = 0.4, and ψB = 2. Let δ
be any number in (0, 1). Then an equilibrium exists, as follows. Market prices are
pY = 1.2 and pO = 1. Market proportions are qY = 0.2 and qO = α = 0. Threshold
prices are pAH = 2.8, pBH = 2, pAL = 0.8, pBL = 1, pAY = 2, and pAO = 0.8. Market
values are (1− δ)VA = 0.2 and VB = 0. Beliefs are µY = 0.6 and µO = 0. The price
of a practice is given by (1 − δ)k = 0.8. It is straightforward to verify that V NNH
and V PPH are the best payoffs for type-H pros and that V
NN
L and V
PN
L are the best
ones for type-L pros. All type-A clients are in practices. Type-B clients hire both
young and old pros; some hire no one. A measure nH = 0.15 of type-H pros buy
practices when young and hold them for two periods (PP). A measure nL = 0.1 of
young type-L pros buy practices when young and sell them after one period (PN);
the rest never buy practices. Figure 3 illustrates. Since pO = pBL, B-L matches may
or may not be renewed; in the figure they are.
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Figure 4. Professionals’ histories in Example 2. The
word “practice” means the purchase of a practice. The
letter b means being hired by a type-B client during
the market phase. Arrows indicate matches renewed
during the negotiation phase.
In general, equilibrium is not unique. For instance, a pooling equilibrium, in
which no one buys practices, can exist under some conditions on parameters. In
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such an equilibrium, market prices and quantities are the same as those of the
benchmark model. Practices are free (k = 0) but beliefs are so low (µY = µO = 0)
that practices are not worth having.
3.5 Why B-Practices Are Not Traded
We have supposed throughout that practices traded during the practice phase nec-
essarily consist of type-A clients. We now ask whether practices consisting of type-B
clients (B-practices, for short) could also be traded.
One might ask: why would someone pay to be matched with a type-B client,
given that one can always find one (or a type-A client, which is better) on the open
market? A professional might prefer to buy a B-practice in order to send the client a
signal that he is a type-H professional. That way he can secure the price pBH rather
than the (presumably lower) pY . So there is a potential incentive for professionals
to purchase B-practices.
The problem is that if such practices had any value, there would be an excess
supply of them. To see this, suppose an equilibrium exists in which only type-H
professionals buy B-practices. When a B-practice changes hands, the client believes
with probability one that the new owner is type-H, since only type-H professionals
buy B-practices. Therefore he is willing to pay up to pBH for the new professional’s
services. The new owner, then, knows he can charge the client up to pBH .
The foregoing is true regardless of whether it is a type-H or type-L professional
selling the practice. The client’s beliefs about the new owner’s types cannot, in
equilibrium, be predicated on the previous owner’s type. And the buyer of the
practice sees no point in finding out what the last price paid by the client was,
as in the case of A-practices. The previous owner’s type simply does not matter.
Consequently, if B-practices have any value, type-L professionals will supply them
too. Since only type-H professionals buy them, this is incompatible with steady-
state equilibrium.
The same logic applies even if we consider an equilibrium where some type-L
pros also buy B-practices.
3.6 Client Welfare
Do clients benefit from the presence of a market for practices? To answer this we
need to compare the values obtained by clients in this scenario (practices but no
government intervention) with the corresponding values from the benchmark model.
In all equilibria we study, type-B clients obtain VB = 0. The average per-period
utility enjoyed by type-A clients is correctly measured by (1−δ)VA, but this quantity
varies from one equilibirum to the next. For the benchmark model, we denote it pibA.
It is
pibA = q(θAH − θBH) . (26)
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As for the current scenario, the equilibria we have described in Theorems 2 and
3 are not necessarily unique. However, we can place an upper bound on type-A
clients’ average utility.
Proposition 4. In any equilibrium with practices but without government inter-
vention, (1− δ)VA ≤ q(θAH − θBH) = pibA.
Neither type-A nor type-B clients, therefore, can do better when there is a market
for practices than when there is not.
4 Equilibrium With Government Intervention
Here we introduce a social planner with power of taxation, and present a form of
taxation which will guarantee the existence of an efficient separating equilibrium,
regardless of parameter values.
When we analyzed equilibrium without taxation, the main source of inefficiency
was the dilution of the signal by type-L professionals, who purchased practices when
young and sold them after only one period. The planner’s efforts, then, should focus
on eliminating this behavior. If one could simply penalize professionals who hold
practices for one period, but not those who hold them for two periods, the market
might achieve separation, leading to efficiency. Type-L professionals would not hold
practices for only one period, because of the penalty; and they would not hold them
for two periods, because clients would not renew their relationships with them.
Hence they would be successfully excluded from buying and selling practices. Type-
H professionals would have no problem holding practices for two periods, and would
not be excluded.
To this end let us suppose that a proportional tax τ is levied whenever a practice
is sold by an old professional, but that practices sold by retiring professionals are
exempt from taxation. Payoffs from buying young and selling after one period are
now
V PNL (τ) = V
PN
H (τ) = −k + pAY + δk + δpO − δτk . (27)
For type-L pros, strategy PP is also affected:
V PPL (τ) = −k + pAY + δpAO + δ2k − δτk . (28)
All other professional payoffs are the same as before.
We assume the tax is purely dissuasive: the planner is not interested in raising
revenue or redistributing surplus. Let us say that the planner sets τ high enough
to dissuade both types from buying a practice when young and selling it after a
single period. As a result, only type-H professionals buy practices, and when they
do so they hold it for two periods. This has the following implications for the open
market:
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Lemma 9. In any equilibrium with optimal taxation, pY = qY θBH + (1 − qY )θL,
qO = 0, and pO = θL.
In equilibrium type-L pros will not buy practices, so each practice will be an A-H
match. Therefore the number of practices, denoted n, cannot exceed min{ψA, 2q}, as
there are ψA type-A clients and 2q type-H professionals in the economy. But n cannot
be less than min{ψA, 2q} either. If it were, there would be type-H professionals
without practices and type-A clients not in practices. Some of these would inevitably
meet on the market, and each time they did a new practice would be created. In
steady-state equilibrium no existing practices are destroyed, so no new ones can be
created. The following theorem formalizes this result.
Proposition 5. In equilibrium with optimal taxation n = min{ψA, 2q}. Equilib-
rium is socially optimal.
It remains to find the incentive compatibility conditions (conditions on k and τ)
which make this equilibrium possible. These are obtained by setting V PNL (τ) ≤ V NNL
and V PPH ≥ V NNH . Client beliefs, to be consistent with equilibrium behavior, will be
µY = 1 and µO = 0.
Let us first consider the case ψA ≥ 2q. In this case n = 2q. All type-H profes-
sionals hold practices, so there is no chance of meeting any on the market: therefore
qY = qO = 0 and pY = pO = θL. Clients get no rents, since VA = VB = 0. Threshold
prices are piH = θiH and piL = θL.
With these results the condition V PNL (τ) ≤ V NNL , whereby it is optimal for type-L
professionals not to buy practices, boils down to
k ≥ θAH − θL
1− δ + δτ (29)
The other condition, V PPH ≥ V NNH , becomes
k ≤ (θAH − θL) + δ(1− α)(θAH − θBH)
1− δ2 + αδ2 (30)
once the appropriate substitutions are made. Recall that α is the probability of
being hired by a type-A client when going on the market as a young professional.
This is of course the proportion of type-A clients among all those hiring young
professionals. In equilibrium, however, the ψA−2q type-A clients on the market get
VA = 0 whatever they do. They are indifferent among the three options (hire no
one, hire young, hire old) and there is no telling which they will choose. So α could
be as low as zero, and it could be as high as
α¯ =
ψA − 2q
1− q , (31)
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which happens when all type-A clients not in practices hire young professionals.
The denominator 1− q is the measure of young professionals on the market, which
in this case means all the type-L ones.
Conditions (29) and (30) can be satisfied simultaneously as long as
τ ≥ αθAH − (1− δ + αδ)θL + (1− α)(1− δ)θBH
(1 + δ − αδ)θAH − θL − δ(1− α)θBH . (32)
The right-hand side of (32) reaches its maximum when α = α¯. Even then it is less
than one, so there is necessarily a level of taxation which ensures that a separating
equilibrium exists.
Example 3. Let θL = 1, θBH = 2 and θAH = 5, q = 0.3, ψA = 0.8, ψB = 2, and
δ = 2/3. As we mentioned, in equilibrium type-A clients on the market (i.e. not
in practices) are indifferent among their three options; assume they all hire young
professionals, so that α = α¯ = 2/7. Then conditions (29) and (30) become
6
1 + 2τ
≤ k ≤ 156/43 . (33)
Setting τ ≥ 17/52 ensures that these conditions can be satisfied. In equilibrium
k satisfies (33), and the other results are as stated previously, i.e. qY = qO = 0,
pY = pO = 1, and n = 2q = 0.6. This is sustained by beliefs (µY , µO) = (1, 0).
Equilibrium is socially efficient. Professionals’ histories for this example are depicted
in Figure 5. Agents in B-L matches are indifferent between renewing and going on
the market; in the diagram these matches are renewed.
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Figure 5. Professionals’ histories in Example 3. The
word “practice” means the purchase of a practice. The
letters a and b mean being hired by that type of client
during the market phase. Arrows indicate matches
renewed during the negotiation phase.
Now let us consider the case ψA < 2q. There are n = ψA practices, not enough
for all high-quality professionals. Each period half the practices are bought by young
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type-H professionals from retiring ones (the other half are kept by old professionals
for a second period). The remaining young type-H agents go on the market, and so
qY =
q − n/2
1− n/2 =
2q − ψA
2− ψA . (34)
This allows us to calculate pY , VA and pAH . Since some young type-H professionals
buy practices while others go on the market, they must be indifferent between
the two. That is to say, V PPH = V
NN
H . All type-A clients are in practices, so
it is impossible to meet one on the market. This means α = 0, which makes
the calculation of V NNH fairly easy. The condition V
NN
H = V
PP
H , once the relevant
substitutions are made, can be manipulated to find the equilibrium price of practices:
k =
[
1− qY
1− δ2
] [
(θAH − θL) + δ(θAH − θBH)
]
. (35)
We must again impose V PNL (τ) ≤ V NNL . This is needed to ensure that buying
practices be sub-optimal for type-L professionals. With the new prices found, the
condition becomes
k ≥ (1− qY )(θAH − θL)
1− δ + δτ (36)
Combining (35) and (36) allows us to find the minimum tax level required for equi-
librium:
τ ≥ (1− δ)(θBH − θL)
(θAH − θL) + δ(θAH − θBH) . (37)
The right-hand side is less than one, therefore taxation can once again ensure the
existence of a separating equilibrium.
Example 4. Let θL = 1, θBH = 2, θAH = 5, q = 0.3, ψA = 0.4, ψB = 2, and
δ = 2/3. Then in equilibrium we have qY = 0.125, qO = 0, pY = 1.125, pO = 1, and
n = 0.4. This is sustained by beliefs (µY , µO) = (1, 0). The price of a practice is
k = 4.25. From (37), the tax rate must be at least 1/8 for this equilibrium to hold.
This outcome is socially efficient. Professionals’ histories are shown in Figure 6.
Agents in B-L matches are indifferent between renewing and going on the market;
in the diagram these matches are renewed.
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Figure 6. Professionals’ histories in Example 4. The
word “practice” means the purchase of a practice. The
letter b means being hired by a type-B client during
the market phase. Arrows indicate matches renewed
during the negotiation phase.
5 Price Ceilings
A social planner may be interested in more than just efficiency, which is achieved
when total surplus in the economy is maximized. The planner may also care about
how this surplus is distributed among the agents. In this section we shall look at the
average per-period utility enjoyed by type-A clients in the various equilibria we have
studied. [Type-B clients obtain zero utility in all our equilibria.] We will consider
how the planner can set a ceiling on the price of professional services in an effort
to transfer some surplus from type-H to type-A agents, without compromising the
efficiency achieved with optimal taxation.
As mentioned in Section 3.6, the average per-period utility enjoyed by a type-A
client is measured by (1 − δ)VA. This quantity may actually be lower when the
proposed tax is in place than when it is not. To give an example, suppose ψA < 2q.
Then average payoff with the tax is
pitaxA =
[
2q − ψA
2− ψA
]
(θAH − θBH) . (38)
where we have used (34). This is what type-A clients can get by hiring young
professionals on the open market, even though in equilibrium they do not. [In
equilibrium they are all in practices, where they get this same value.] The average
payoff without tax, denoted piniA (ni for no intervention), is
piniA =
[
q − nH
1 + nH − ψA
]
(θAH − θBH) ; (39)
where the expression in brackets is gotten from (50) and (51). In the first part of
the appendix it is shown that nH < ψA/2. It follows that pitaxA < pi
ni
A . Even though
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the equilibrium with taxation is efficient and the one without taxation is not, the
gain in efficiency was made at clients’ expense.
Some of the rents captured by professionals can be redistributed to type-A clients
if in addition to imposing a tax on early sales of practices the government uses
another policy instrument, namely a ceiling on the price of professional services. In
what follows we assume that the social planner can distinguish neither clients’ nor
professionals’ types. In fact we will assume that a single ceiling can be set, regardless
of the agents’ types, the professional’s age, or the origin of the match (practice or
open market).
In the optimal-taxation equilibrium, the highest price paid for professional ser-
vices is pAY = pAH = θAH , the price charged by the owner of a practice. The next
highest price is pBH = θBH , the price a type-B client pays a type-H professional
when their types are known to each other. In order for sellers of practices to con-
vince buyers that their clientele is type-A, they must show that these clients paid
more than pBH . Given these considerations, the ceiling, which we will call p¯, should
be set lower than θAH but higher than θBH . This way practice owners can charge p¯
and still prove that their clients are type-A.3
If this is to be done without affecting efficiency, care must be taken to gauge
the effects of the price ceiling on the various payoffs to professionals. As long as
p¯ > θBH , an efficient equilibrium still exists as described in Section 4. The incentive
compatibility conditions change somewhat, as a result of p¯ being charged instead of
pAY and pAH .4
With such a price ceiling (and the appropriate tax) in place, type-A clients in
practices get utility θAH − p¯ per period. Those type-A clients not in practices, if
there are any, get nothing. The average per-period payoff for type-A clients in this
price-ceiling scenario, denoted picA, is therefore
picA =
n (θAH − p¯)
ψA
. (40)
How does this compare with average payoffs in the other cases? From Theorem
4 we know that pibA is the highest average payoff type-A clients can get in equilibium
without government intervention. The following theorem states that this can be
improved upon.
Proposition 6. In equilibrium with optimal taxation, there exists a price ceiling p¯
such that picA > pi
b
A.
3Note that when ψA ≥ 2q, the price pBH = θBH is never actually paid in equilibrium, the reason
being that all type-H professionals own practices, so B-H matches are never formed. However,
the fact that type-H professionals could go on the market and be matched with type-B clients
(eventually charging tham pBH = θBH) means that the requirement p¯ > pBH is necessary in this
case too.
4To obtain the new conditions, replace θAH by p¯ in equations (29), (30) and (32); and replace
θAH by (p¯− qY θBH)/(1− qY ) in equations (35), (36) and (37), where qY is given in (34).
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This result ensures that by using the two policy instruments jointly, the govern-
ment can bring about social efficiency without detriment to clients.
6 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we present a theoretical model of two related markets: a market
for professional services, and a market for the practices in which these services
are provided. We show how the workings of these two markets jointly determine
which types of clients and professionals get matched with one another. We call an
equilibrium efficient if it achieves the maximum possible amount of matches between
the professionals who provide the highest-quality services and the clients who stand
to benefit the most from them.
We find that without a market for practices, the economy necessarily settles
at an inefficient equilibrium. The market for services cannot, by itself, assure the
socially optimal allocation of professionals to clients. The main obstacle to efficiency
is that clients and professionals do not know each other’s types until after they have
transacted. Professional services are an experience good, and matches early in a
professional’s career are made in a context of two-sided uncertainty.
When a market for practices exists, however, social efficiency is possible. The
reason is that the practices market can act as a catalyst for the transmission of infor-
mation. Professionals who buy practices learn their clients’ types from the practices’
previous owners; a practice is in fact valueless unless this information is provided.
Clients in practices also obtain information — albeit imperfect information — about
their professionals’ types, simply from the fact that the latter bought practices.
The existence of a practices market is not sufficient to guarantee efficiency. If
there are too few high-need (i.e. type-A) clients in the economy, then competition
between high- and low-quality professionals for the opportunity to serve these clients
ends up driving some high-quality pros out of the practices market altogether. These
end up being matched with low-need clients, at the same time that some low-quality
pros end up serving high-need clients: an obviously inefficient allocation.
In all equilibria without government intervention, buying a practice is always
worthwhile for a low-quality professional whenever it is worthwhile for a high-quality
one. This means that buying a practice does not constitute a clear signal of high
quality. More precisely, there does not exist a separating equilibrium in which the
incentive compatibility conditions are satisfied strictly.5
By taxing the sale of practices in the right way, i.e. taxing those that are sold
prior to retirement age, the government can create conditions where it is always
profitable for a high-quality pro to buy a practice, but never for a low-quality one.
Then the purchase of a practice becomes a perfect signal of quality, and social
efficiency follows as a result. There is no distortion, since no taxes are actually
collected: the tax is like a fine or penalty.
5This can be shown formally, but has been omitted for brevity.
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Although taxation can bring about an efficient matching of professional-client
matchings, it can at the same time reduce clients’ welfare. This can be corrected,
however, by placing an appropriate ceiling on the price of professional services. The
rents accruing to type-A clients can actually be made greater than what they are in
any equilibrium without public intervention. [Type-B clients’ rents are zero in all
equilibria.] Thus the twofold objective of providing social efficiency and increasing
client welfare can be achieved with two policy instruments.
In the United States, taxes are levied when a practice changes hands. There are
sales, income, and capital-gains taxes to be paid, according to the components of
the practice. To our knowledge, however, there is no major tax advantage offered
to retiring professionals.
If anything, the contrary is true. Under Internal Revenue Code Section 1031,
a person selling a practice can be exempt from capital-gains taxes if he purchases
like-kind property (i.e. another practice) within a short period of time. In our
model, this statute would make it more profitable for type-L professionals to choose
strategy PP (buying two practices in succession). It would certainly be an added
obstacle to efficiency.
Naturally we should not automatically assume the worst of a professional availing
himself of IRC 1031. It is a great help to those professionals who simply want
to move to a different neighborhood or city. Yet it is certain that others besides
these have benefited. Several professionals, advertising on the internet and in trade
journals, boast of having bought and resold several practices over their lifetime, to
great personal advantage; and they offer to help others do the same. We are of
course in no position to judge the quality of professional services offered by these
individuals. However, such actions can clearly be undertaken by both good and bad
practitioners, and the fact that the tax system facilitates them can only erode the
overall efficiency of the system, as we have defined it.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that no type-B clients hire young professionals.
Then they must hire old professionals, since there are not enough type-A clients to
keep all professionals in the economy employed. So VB must be the value to a type-B
client of hiring an old professional. Since VB = 0, we have pO = qOθBH + (1− qO)θL.
And if young professionals are not hired by type-B clients, they must be hired
by type-A clients. So VA must be the value to a type-A client of hiring a young
professional; with (5) and (2) this allows us to compute pAH = (1−q)(θAH−θL)+pY .
From (5), we must have pY ≥ qθBH + (1 − q)θL, otherwise VB would be positive.
This leads to pAH ≥ qθBH + (1− q)θAH . Since q ≥ qO, this means pAH > pO. In the
negotiation phase, therefore, type-H professionals offer type-A clients pAH , and all
A-H matches are renewed.
So if no type-B clients hire young professionals, all young professionals (a mea-
sure 1) are hired by type-A clients, and all A-H matches (a measure q) are renewed.
In steady state, where both generations of professionals coexist, the total measure of
type-A clients must therefore be at least 1 + q. Since ψA < 1 + q, this is impossible.
Therefore some type-B clients must hire young professionals. Since VB = 0, this
means pY = qθBH + (1− q)θL.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose there are old type-H professionals on the open
market. Then they have rationally made offers that were rejected. This can only
happen if pO ≥ min{pAH , pBH} = θBH . But if pO ≥ θBH , the value of hiring an old
professional is negative, and no one hires any. This is a situation of excess supply.
Proof of Lemma 3. Since qO = 0, pO cannot be less than θL, otherwise VB
would be positive. Suppose pO > θL. Then the value of hiring an old professional
is negative, and no one hires any. But if pO > θL, it is higher than both pAL and
pBL, and as a result all A-L and B-L matches are dissolved. Therefore all type-L
professionals end up on the market when old. This is a situation of excess supply.
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose qY > q. Young professionals either go on the market
or buy practices; there are no other possibilities. So if proportionately more type-H
than type-L pros go on the market, it means that proportionately fewer type-H than
type-L pros buy practices. Hence qY > q implies µY < q. As a result,
pAY < qθAH + (1− q)θL − (1− δ)VA . (41)
Since (1− δ)VA ≥ qY θAH + (1− qY )θL− pY by definition, and since we are supposing
qY > q, we find that (41) implies pAY < pY . At these prices, all young type-L pros
will prefer going on the market to buying practices, even if the latter are free. Indeed
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V NNL > V
PN
L and V
NP
L > V
PP
L . Consequently qY ≤ q, contrary to what has been
supposed. We conclude that qY ≤ q. And as a corollary we can state that µY ≥ q.
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose qO > q. Compared to the population of old pros
in the economy, there is a relative abundance of type-H ones on the market. This
could be due to two things: either (i) proportionately fewer type-H than type-L pros
renewed their matches during the negotiation phase; or (ii) proportionately fewer
type-H than type-L pros bought practices when old.
The first is impossible. Since pAH > pAL and pBH > pBL, a price pO high enough
to cause the breakup of even some A-H matches would necessarily cause the breakup
of all A-L matches, and similarly for B-H and B-L matches.
The second possibility would entail µO < q as a consistent belief, and so
pAO < qθAH + (1− q)θL − (1− δ)VA . (42)
Since (1− δ)VA ≥ qOθAH + (1− qO)θL− pO by definition, and since we are supposing
qO > q, we find that (42) implies pAO < pO. At these prices, old type-L pros will not
buy practices, even if they are free. The second explanation is therefore impossible
also.
Proof of Lemma 6. Suppose the last price paid by the client is pAY . By the same
reasoning as that used to derive (12), the most a type-B client would pay in the
same circumstances would be µY θBH + (1 − µY )θL − (1 − δ)VB. We need to show
that pAY is greater than this last amount. From (12) and the fact that VB = 0, this
is equivalent to showing that µY (θAH − θBH) > (1− δ)VA. From Lemma 4 we know
that µY ≥ q. With equations (14), (15) and (16), and Lemmas 4 and 5, we can show
that (1− δ)VA ≤ q(θAH − θBH). Hence µY (θAH − θBH) > (1− δ)VA, so price pAY fully
reveals client type.
Suppose the last price paid by the client is pAH . The most a type-B client would
pay under the same circumstances is pBH = θBH . We need to establish pAH > pBH .
We know that pAH = θAH − (1− δ)VA. From the previous paragraph we know that
(1−δ)VA ≤ q(θAH−θBH). It follows that pAH > pBH ; therefore pAH is fully-revealing.
Proof of Lemma 7. In any period there is a measure 2 of professionals employed
in the economy (half of them young, half of them old); and there are fewer than 1+q
type-A clients. So type-B clients must employ more than 1−q professionals. If they
hire only young ones, then some of those they hire will have to be type-H, since there
are only 1− q type-L ones; moreover, all old professionals will have to be employed
by type-A clients. Thus there will be both B-H and A-L matches in the economy,
an inefficient situation. Similarly, if type-B clients hire only old professionals, some
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of those they hire will have to be type-H; and all young professionals will have to
be employed by type-A clients. Again this means there will be both B-H and A-L
matches. We conclude that type-B clients must hire both young and old professionals
if equilibrium is to be efficient. Since VB = 0, market prices must be as stated.
Proof of Lemma 8. Suppose ψA ≤ 2q and suppose an efficient equilibrium exists.
From Lemmas 4 and 5 we know that qY ≤ q and qO ≤ q, which means there are
both young and old type-L professionals on the market. Since no A-L matches
are allowed, type-A clients cannot hire anyone on the market: they must all be in
practices all the time. So α = 0.
The fact that A-L matches cannot take place also means that type-L pros cannot
buy practices. In other words, strategy NN must be optimal for them. This means
V NNL ≥ V PNL and V NNL ≥ V NPL , which yield the following two inequalities:
−k + pAY + δk ≤ pY ; (43)
−k + pAO + δk ≤ pO . (44)
Since there are practices and type-L agents cannot buy them, it has to be optimal
for type-H pros to buy them. Lemma 7 tells us that both pY and pO must be less
than θBH in an efficient equilibrium. And pBH = θBH is easily obtained from (2) and
the fact that VB = 0. These observations, combined with (21), allow us to compute
V NNH = pY + δθBH . (45)
Let us compare this to V PPH . If type-H pros buy practices when young, they are the
only ones doing so; consistency therefore requires µY = 1, which implies pAH = pAY .
Now (43) and (23) tell us that V PPH cannot exceed (1 + δ)pY , which is strictly less
than V NNH . V
NP
H and V
PN
H can also be shown to be less than V
NN
H using (43) and
(44). For type-H professionals, therefore, strategy NN (never buying a practice)
strictly dominates all the others.
So type-L professionals cannot buy practices, type-H ones do not want to, and
yet all type-A clients must be in practices. This is of course impossible, and we
must conclude that an efficient equilibrium does not exist when ψA ≤ 2q.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Part 1 (necessity). We know from Lemma 8 that an equilibrium cannot be
efficient if ψA ≤ 2q. So let us assume ψA > 2q. For equilibrium to be efficient, all
type-H professionals must be employed by type-A clients. Since type-B clients hire
both young and old pros (see Lemma 7), and since B-H matches are not allowed,
type-H professionals must never go on the market. They must all buy practices
and keep them for two periods. This means qY = qO = 0, which in turn means
pY = pO = θL by Lemma 7.
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Since type-H pros never buy practices when old, clients do not expect them to,
that is to say µO = 0. With qY = qO = 0 and pY = pO = θL it becomes impossible
for any client to obtain positive utility on the market, and so VA = 0. Threshold
prices adjust accordingly: pAH = θAH , pBH = θBH , pAY = µY θAH + (1 − µY )θL, and
pAO = θL.
For strategy PP to be optimal for type-H professionals, we need V PPH ≥ V NNH .
With the results obtained so far, this is
µY (θAH − θL)− (1− δ2)k + δθAH ≥ α δ(pAH + δk) + (1− α) δθBH . (46)
As for type-L professionals, we can see, given the market and threshold prices found,
that V NPL < V
NN
L and V
PP
L < V
PN
L . This leaves only NN and PN as viable strategies.
Although these young type-L professionals can buy practices in equilibrium, they
cannot all do so. If they did, the number of practices in the economy would have to
be at least 1 + q (i.e. 1− q for the young type-L pros and another 2q for young and
old type-H ones); but there are not enough type-A clients for that. At least some of
the young type-L professionals must choose NN, therefore V NNL ≥ V PNL is necessary.
This yields
(1− δ)k ≥ µY (θAH − θL) . (47)
Combining (46) and (47) we obtain the necessary condition
µY θL + (1− µY )θAH ≥ α(pAH + δk) + (1− α)θBH . (48)
The left-hand side of (48) reaches its highest possible value, and the right-hand side
its lowest possible value, when all type-A clients are in practices, so that α = 0. This
happens when all type-H pros play strategy PP and a measure ψA − 2q of type-L
pros play PN and the rest NN. In that case µY = q/(ψA − q). Substituting these
values into (48) and rearranging, we obtain (25).
Part 2 (sufficiency). Suppose (25) is met. Then an efficient equilibrium exists,
described as follows. The number of practices is n = ψA. Note that this is greater
than 2q, otherwise (25) would not be met. Each period all young type-H pros and
a measure ψA − 2q of young type-L pros buy practices; the former will hold on
to them for two periods, but the latter will sell them after only one period. No
one buys practices when old. Beliefs are µY = q/(ψA − q) and µO = 0, which is
consistent with the trade in practices just described. The price of a practice is
k = µY (θAH − θL)/(1− δ).
Conditions on the open market are given by qY = qO = 0 and pY = pO = θL.
Client values are VA = VB = 0. Since all type-A clients are in practices, only
type-B clients are matched on the market, hence α = 0. Threshold prices in the
negotiation phase are pAY = µY θAH + (1− µY )θL, pAO = θL, pAH = θAH , pBH = θBH ,
pAL = pBL = θL.
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With these values we can easily show that V PPH = max{V NNH , V NPH , V PNH , V PPH }
and V NNL = V
PN
L = max{V NNL , V NPL , V PNL , V PPL }, confirming that the behavior de-
scribed is optimal. Sellers of practices can show potential buyers that their clients
are type-A, since pAH > θBH and pAY exceeds what a type-B client would be willing
to pay a young pro (given qY and µY ). Since all type-H pros are matched with
type-A clients, this equilibrium is efficient.
Proof of Proposition 3. In this case an equilibrium exists, described as follows.
Some professionals of each type buy practices when young; the low-quality ones
hold them for a single period, the high-quality ones for two. Let nj denote the
measure young type-j pros who buy practices when young. All type-A clients are
in practices, therefore α = 0 and
2nH + nL = ψA . (49)
Average quality of pros on the market is given by
qY =
q − nH
1− nH − nL , (50)
and qO = 0. Beliefs are consistent with professionals’ behavior, therefore
µY =
nH
nH + nL
, (51)
and µO = 0. Market prices are pY = qY θBH + (1− qY )θL and pO = θL. Client values
are (1 − δ)VA = qY (θAH − θBH) and VB = 0. Threshold prices are calculated in the
usual manner, and the price of a practice is given by (1−δ)k = (µY −qY )(θAH−θL).
The values of nH , nL, qY and µY are found by solving equations (49), (50), (51), and
the following:
(1− qY )(θBH − θL) = (1− µY )(θAH − θL) . (52)
Equation (52) was obtained by setting V NNH = V
PP
H and V
NN
L = V
PN
L . It can be
verified easily that these represent optimal strategies for professionals. What is
needed to make this equilibrium stand is for the measures nj to be in the relevant
ranges, i.e. nH ∈ (0, q) and nL ∈ (0, 1− q). The fact that (25) does not hold ensures
this (see below).
Proof that 0 < nH < q and 0 < nL < 1− q (Proposition 3).
The measure of young type-H professionals buying practices, nH , is found by
reducing (49), (50), (51) and (52) to a single equation. This is the quadratic
h(x) ≡ 2x2 + Fx+G = 0 , (53)
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where
F = 2 + S + qS − 3ψA ; (54)
G = ψA(ψA − 1− qS) ; (55)
and S is the positive constant (θBH − θL)/(θAH − θBH). A solution to (53) exists if
and only if F 2− 8G ≥ 0, and this inequality is the first thing we have to prove. We
find
F 2 − 8G = (2 + S + qS)2 + ψA(ψA − 4− 6S + 2qS) . (56)
The theorem supposes that 0 < ψA < q(2 +S). The right-hand of (56) is decreasing
in ψA over this range, and thus approaches its infimum as ψA tends towards q(2+S).
This infimum is found to be (2 +S− 2q− 2qS)2, a non-negative number. Therefore
F 2 − 8G ≥ 0 holds.
Because 2nH + nL = ψA, the conditions 0 < nH < q and 0 < nL < 1 − q boil
down to
max
{
0,
ψA − 1 + q
2
}
< nH < min
{
q,
ψA
2
}
. (57)
The function h(x) is a convex parabola centered at xc ≡ −F/4. Given that ψA <
q(2 + S), it is fairly straightforward to check that (1/2)(ψA − 1 + q) is greater than
xc, i.e. right of center. This means that only the higher of the two roots of (53) can
satisfy (57) — see Figure 7. It is also easy to show that q and (1/2)ψA are greater
than xc. We calculate
h(q) = [q(2 + S)− ψA] [(1 + q)− ψA] > 0 ; (58)
h(ψA/2) = (1/2)(1− q)ψAS > 0 ; (59)
h((1/2)(ψA − 1 + q)) = (1/2)(1− q)(1 + S)[ψA − (1 + q)] < 0 ; (60)
where we have used the restrictions on ψA to determine signs. These inequalities
establish that (1/2)(ψA − 1 + q) < nH < min{q, (1/2)ψA}.
It remains to show that nH > 0. To have nH ≤ 0 it would be necessary to have
h(0) ≥ 0 and xc ≤ 0. This means F ≤ 0 and G ≤ 0 would be required. However,
G ≥ 0 implies ψA ≥ 1 + qS, and also S < 1, since ψA < 1 + q by assumption; and
these results imply F < 0. Therefore either F or G must be negative, so nH > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. This follows from equations (14), (15) and (16), and
Lemmas 4 and 5.
Proof of Lemma 9. Professionals who hold practices do not end up on the market
when old. A type-j professional matched with a type-i client will end up on the
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Figure 7. The function h(x).
market when old only if pO ≥ pij. Since pAH > pAL and pBH > pBL, the proportion
of type-H agents who end up on the market when old is no greater than that of
type-L agents. Hence qO ≤ qY . The rest of the proof follows the same lines as those
of Lemmas 1, 2 and 3.
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose n < min{ψA, 2q}. Steady state requires
that half the practices be held by the younger generation, hence a measure n/2 <
q of young type-H professionals buy practices. This means some young type-H
professionals offer their services on the market, so that qY > 0. Since n < ψA, some
type-A clients are not in practices.
What do the type-A clients not in practices do on the market? Hiring no one
gives them zero. Since qO = 0 and pO = θL (by Lemma 9), hiring old professionals
also gives them zero. But since pY = qY θBH + (1− qY )θL (by Lemma 9) and qY > 0,
hiring young professionals gives them positive value. Therefore they hire young
professionals.
This means that some young type-H professionals are hired by type-A clients
on the market. When they become old, they can charge them pAH . So when they
retire, they have a practice to sell. Since all those of their generation who bought
practices also have practices to sell, the total number of practices has increased.
This cannot happen in steady-state equilibrium.
We conclude that the number of practices must be n = min{ψA, 2q}. This is also
the number of A-H matches. Since it is at its maximum possible level, equilibrium
is socially efficient.
Proof of Proposition 6. Since p¯ can be made arbitrarily close to (but greater
than) θBH , the level of picA can be made greater than pi
b
A as long as (n/ψA) > q. If
ψA ≤ 2q then n = ψA. The result is obtained, since (n/ψA) = 1.
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If ψA > 2q, on the other hand, then n = 2q. The fact that ψA < 1 + q allows us
to say that (n/ψA) > 2q/(1 + q), which is greater than q. Therefore picA > pi
b
A for p¯
close enough to θBH .
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